657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
179 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474
433 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops. In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy. Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
179 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society, as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
179 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
•661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
179 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
•661 their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
[435] Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
[673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[935] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
[661] who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably, the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe: 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
[379] than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, especially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

His main function is to manage the affairs of the village, apprehend crininals, report and register births and deaths, collect taxes and represent the government in all matters involving the relationship between the government and his village. Because of his position as the representative of the govrernment, he usually enjoys a considerable amount of power which, over the years, many omdas have used it to obtain personal benefits.

In 1958 the committee appointed for the examination of the possibility of applying the system to Awlad Ali noticed that vil[illegible] in the sense of a compact settlement similar to that existing in the rural area simply do not exist in the Western Desert region. There are a few settled communities in the area but they are scattered homes or a few stores. These communities have no identifiable boundaries or administrative existence. The area as a whole is divided into ten administrative districts, each having a police station. These districts correspond to the old Senusia Zawyas which played an important role in maintaining order in the era until the First World War. Until that time the area was divided into fourteen zones each of which was under the jurisdiction of one of the zawyas. The zawyas were mainly religious centers, or shrines, inhabited and directed by a member of the Senusi order of Cyrenaica. The role of the head of the zawya was to teach the Qoraan and spread the teachings of the Senusi order. One of the ways the zawyas attracted followers was through distribution of food and clothing to those who joined it. The zawyas also provided places of refuge for those who needed protection since no one could force his way into the sacred zawyas. Because of their religious position which put